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LETTERS
Antiviral Drugs for 
Treatment of 
Patients Infected 
with Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 Virus 
To the Editor: The emergence 
of inﬂ   uenza A pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 virus in North America and as-
sociated illness and death suggest that 
humanity faces a dangerous threat. 
Viruses isolated from a sample of pa-
tients with conﬁ   rmed cases in early 
phases of the outbreak demonstrated 
resistance to amantadine and riman-
tadine. At present, circulating viruses 
appear to be largely susceptible to the 
neuraminidase inhibitors oseltamivir 
and zanamivir, although oseltamivir 
resistance has been observed in re-
cent cases in Europe, Asia, and North 
America (1). More recently, pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus resistance to osel-
tamivir emerged during treatment of 
2 immunosuppressed patients in the 
United States. Such cases demonstrate 
that oseltamivir resistance can emerge 
in infected persons treated with oselta-
mivir. To date, all isolates tested have 
been susceptible to zanamivir.
Vaccines are being deployed in 
some well-resourced countries but are 
generally not available to the public. It 
appears that little if any protection is 
offered from previous seasonal inﬂ  u-
enza vaccines. In the spring of 1918, 
epidemiologic observations indicated 
the likely emergence and spread of 
another inﬂ   uenza virus (H1N1) that 
caused few deaths. However, later that 
year, transmission resurged and was 
associated in 2 waves with increased 
illness and deaths. We cannot predict 
whether the 2009 pathogen will follow 
a similar temporal pattern and evolve 
toward increased virulence. Even if 
vaccine development and delivery 
could be achieved within 6 months, 
an aggressive schedule, large supplies 
of vaccine against pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 may not be available until late 
2009.
Antiviral drugs are used to treat 
patients with strongly suspected or 
conﬁ  rmed  inﬂ   uenza. However, until 
a vaccine is available, speciﬁ  c  pro-
tection by pharmaceutical products 
is limited to antiviral drugs. Non-
pharmaceutical interventions are also 
available for prevention. Some gov-
ernments and organizations are taking 
steps that would enable mass adminis-
tration of these drugs (2). This admin-
istration may prove problematic. A 
recent study showed that schoolchil-
dren may incompletely adhere to os-
eltamivir prophylaxis instructions (3). 
If other groups are given oseltamivir 
prophylaxis, they cannot necessarily 
be expected to follow administration 
guidelines; compliance with taking 
the recommended number of doses 
at appropriate times is difﬁ  cult to en-
force. Moreover, even when compli-
ance is high, oseltamivir prophylaxis 
may fail (4).
The ﬁ  rst viable oseltamivir-resis-
tant human inﬂ  uenza viruses (H1N1) 
emerged and became prevalent in 
the United States and Europe in the 
2007–08 inﬂ  uenza season, and preva-
lence of such viruses has continued 
in 2009. The potential for overuse of 
antiviral drugs, especially oseltamivir, 
to select for existing antiviral drug-
resistant strains is unknown. Ecologic 
studies suggest a lack of association 
between prevalence of oseltamivir 
use and prevalence of oseltamivir re-
sistance (5). However, examination 
of seasonal inﬂ   uenza virus isolates 
obtained before introduction of oselta-
mivir showed an absence of resistance 
(6), leading some to conclude that an-
tiviral monotherapy leads to selection 
pressure for resistance (7). Regardless 
of origin of resistance, recent seasonal 
inﬂ   uenza viruses (H1N1) of the A/
Brisbane/57/2007 lineage from around 
the world display such resistance.
A similar resistance pattern could 
occur with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
virus. Regardless of the mutational 
mechanism for antiviral drug resis-
tance, mass use of antiviral drugs 
could potentially lead to selection 
pressure for drug-resistant viruses 
(7). Experience with seasonal inﬂ  u-
enza demonstrated the ﬁ  tness of some 
oseltamivir-resistant strains (8). More-
over, modeling studies suggest that 
antiviral-resistant strains may spread 
rapidly and markedly affect pandemic 
outcomes (9).
What are we to do? Until a vac-
cine is available, combination an-
tiviral therapy and rapid diagnostic 
testing may be needed (7). Given the 
recently described low sensitivity of 
currently available rapid tests, apply-
ing such assays to all patients is prob-
lematic (10). If rapid testing has a role, 
it should be used in testing persons at 
highest risk for developing inﬂ  uenza 
complications. However, early empir-
ic therapy based on clinical manifes-
tations and knowledge of circulating 
strains is likely more appropriate than 
reliance on tests with low sensitivity. 
Updated guidelines recently issued by 
the World Health Organization (www.
who.int/csr/resources/publications/
swineflu/h1n1_guidelines_pharma-
ceutical_mngt.pdf) and the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention 
(www.cdc.gov/h1n1ﬂ  u/recommenda-
tions.htm) for prophylaxis should be 
followed to keep resistance in check 
and save the lives of patients.
A widely administered protective 
vaccine is needed to prevent transmis-
sion and infection and preserve the ef-
ﬁ  cacy of antiviral agents. Indiscrimi-
nant administration of these agents 
could support proliferation of antiviral 
resistance in pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
virus or an evolved variant. Appro-
priate use of antiviral chemotherapy 
is complex. Identifying the groups at 
high risk for serious illness for drug 
therapy and appropriate antiviral 
therapy in situations of co-circulation 
of seasonal and pandemic (H1N1) vi-
ruses with various susceptibility pat-
terns needs elucidation. Without clear 
evidence-based guidance, a global 
public health disaster could occur if 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 reemerges 
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later this year with higher virulence or 
widespread antiviral drug resistance.
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Imported 
Ciproﬂ  oxacin-
Resistant Neisseria 
meningitidis 
To the Editor: Emergence and 
spread of antimicrobial drug resistance 
in community-acquired infections is a 
global threat. Resistance of Neisseria 
meningitidis raises concern because 
of severity of disease caused by this 
organism and the need for immediate 
treatment of infected patients.
We report an imported case of 
meningococcal disease caused by ﬂ  u-
oroquinolone-resistant  N. meningiti-
dis. The patient, a previously healthy, 
unvaccinated 43-year-old man who 
had traveled internationally, was hos-
pitalized because of high fever, neck 
stiffness, and a diffuse petechial rash 
Signs and symptoms were observed 
24 hours after he had returned to It-
aly from a 10-day business trip dur-
ing February–March 2009, to New 
Delhi and Chennai in India and a 
stopover of a few hours in Frankfurt, 
Germany.
Microscopic examination of cere-
brospinal ﬂ  uid showed gram-negative 
diplococci and culture documented N. 
meningitidis serogroup A. The strain 
was characterized as serotype 4,21 
subtype P1.9 by using monoclonal an-
tibodies. Multilocus sequence typing 
performed at the National Reference 
Laboratory for Invasive Meningococ-
cal Diseases in Rome characterized 
the strain as sequence type (ST)-4789 
and belonging to clonal complex ST-5/
subgroup III.
Antimicrobial drug susceptibility 
was determined by using an agar dilu-
tion test, and MICs were determined by 
using an agar disk-diffusion test (Etest; 
AB Biodisk, Solna, Sweden) and stan-
dard techniques. The strain was re-
sistant to ciproﬂ  oxacin, levoﬂ  oxacin, 
and trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole 
and susceptible to penicillin, ampi-
cillin, ceftriaxone, chloramphenicol, 
rifampin, and azithromycin. MICs for 
ciproﬂ  oxacin, levoﬂ  oxacin, penicillin, 
ampicillin, and ceftriaxone were 0.25, 
0.25, 0.03, 0.12, and <0.016 mg/L, re-
spectively (Figure). The patient recov-
ered after treatment with ceftriaxone.
Before results of antimicrobial 
drug–susceptibility testing were avail-
able, 15 adult contacts of the patient 
received ciproﬂ   oxacin as chemopro-
phylaxis according to public health 
recommendations in Italy. After posi-
tive test results, all contacts were of-
fered repeat chemoprophylaxis with 
rifampin; 13 of them accepted. A di-
agnosis of meningitis and results of 
antibiograms were sent to the patient’s 
place of employment in India and 
to the airport manager in Frankfurt. 
However, we were not able to assess 
what chemoprophylaxis was given to 
the patient’s fellow employees and air 
travel contacts. No secondary cases 
have been detected so far in Italy.
Sporadic cases of infection with 
N. meningitidis (mainly serogroup B) 
with reduced susceptibility to cipro-
ﬂ  oxacin have been reported in Europe, 
North and South America, and Austra-
lia since 2000 (1–4). Ciproﬂ  oxacin-re-
sistant N. meningitidis of serogroup A 
caused an outbreak of meningococcal 
meningitis in Delhi, India, in 2005 and 
a recurrence in 2006 (5). Although the 
patient reported in our study had no 
known contact in India with patients 
who had meningococcal disease, mul-
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